Angela Mendelovici 2017-09-06T10:00:58+00:00

Project Description


  • Philosophy of Mind

  • Philosophy of Psychology


  • Rotman Institute of Philosophy
    Western University
    Stevenson Hall 4135
    London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5B8

  • (519) 661-2111 x81583


Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy, Western University

Angela Mendelovici is a philosopher with research interests in the philosophy of mind. Angela’s recent work investigates the relationship between mental representation and consciousness, and the various roles that the notion of mental representation is thought to play. Her work is partly motivated by the suspicion that there are multiple notions of mental representation that we need in order to fully understand mental phenomena.
For more information about Angela Mendelovici, please visit her webpage at

Angela Mendelovici’s research explores the nature of mental representation. In particular, she is developing a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that mental representation is determined by phenomenal consciousness. Other aspects of her work concern the relationship between mental representation and other features of mental states, such as tracking relations and functional roles. She also works on the representational and phenomenal aspects of pain, emotions, and colour experience.

Selected Publications:

Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass. forthcoming. Co-authored by Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget.

Tracking Representationalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. 209-235. 2014. Co-authored by David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici.
Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 135-157. 2014.

Intentionalism About Moods. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136. 2013.

Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443. 2013.

Is Morality Unified? Evidence That Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10):3162-3180. 2011. Co-authored by Carolyn Parkinson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philipp E. Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Victoria McGeer & Thalia Wheatley.

Phil 4410/9611: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind

Phil 2400: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind

Phil 4410/9661: Mental Representation

Phil 3410: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind

Phil 4410/9605: Concepts

Phil 2260: Introduction to Philosophy of Language

Autumn, 2011, Foundations Seminar: Mental Representation, The Australian National University (graduate seminar)

Fall, 2010, Philosophy of Language, The University of Western Ontario

Fall, 2010, Problems in Philosophy: Mental Representation, The University of Western Ontario (graduate/undergraduate seminar)