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Several recent authors – Loar, McGinn, Strawson, and Horgan, among others – have argued that the intentionality proper to conscious experience is somehow prior to, and grounds, other forms of intentionality. Here as elsewhere in philosophy, however, it is not always clear what is meant by “priority” and “grounding.” Although the kind of priority these authors have in mind is distinctively metaphysical, in this paper I present a way of unpacking the priority of the intentionality proper to conscious experiences in epistemological terms.


Uriah Kriegel is a research director at the Jean Nicod Institute in Paris. He works mostly in philosophy of mind and metaphysics, but is also interested in cognitive science, metaethics, epistemology, early analytic philosophy, and a number of other research areas. He received his PhD from Brown University in 2003, whereupon he started teaching at the philosophy department at the University of Arizona.

Read more about Uriah Kriegel.


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