CONFERENCE DESCRIPTION The Rotman Institute of Philosophy second annual conference, Knowledge and Models in Climate Science: Philosophical, Historical, and Scientific Perspectives, took place on Oct. 24-26, 2014. The conference brought together researchers to discuss the use of models in understanding the climate from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Models and computer simulations are essential not […]
ABSTRACT Climate prediction and weather prediction are very different: due to constant refinements and new techniques, the life time of a climate model is much less than the forecast we ask it to make, whereas the same weather model can be used to forecast tomorrow’s weather, day after day, for months if not years — […]
ABSTRACT Observations made through instruments that cannot also be made with our unaided sensory organs lack epistemic credibility, claim the constructive empiricists. One well-known challenge to this view draws attention to the fact that distinct types of instruments have been known to yield the same or at least highly similar observational outputs. The implication, of […]
ABSTRACT Isaac Newton famously claimed that hypotheses, i.e., unproved propositions, have no place in “experimental philosophy.” Maxwell disagreed and proposed three methods that can legitmately be employed when a scientist lacks proof for a theory, or even a theory to be proved. What are these methods, and are they legitimate? SPEAKER PROFILE Peter Achinstein specializes […]
ABSTRACT Scientists and philosophers who seek, or advocate seeking, a “theory of everything” (e.g., string theory, Thomas Nagel’s panpsychic theory, David Chalmers’ “construction of the world”) want to produce a grand, unifying theory that can explain everything on the basis of fundamental laws and constituents of the universe. Advocates of this idea offer very general […]