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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20140124T103000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20140124T120000
DTSTAMP:20260404T064207
CREATED:20170819T174015Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210714T145952Z
UID:18320-1390559400-1390564800@www.rotman.uwo.ca
SUMMARY:Stathis Psillos: Revisiting the ‘Bankruptcy of Science’ Debate
DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT\n\nThe ‘bankruptcy of science’ controversy took place in France towards the end of the nineteenth century. It was a heated debate among scientists\, philosophers\, literary critics\, novelists and various public figures that was widely advertised in the press and caught the attention of the wider public on both sides of the Atlantic. It initially concerned the scope and limits of the scientific worldview and the relation between science and religion\, but in later stages (especially when Henri Poincare got involved in it) it was focused on the very idea of objectivity of science and scientific progress. At the same time\, another debate concerning the alleged ‘bankruptcy of atomism’ was taking place among scientists in Europe\, targeting atomism as a scientific worldview as well as a theory about the structure of matter. Various important arguments for and against a realist conception of science were launched in the context of these inter-connected debates (such as the so-called ‘pessimistic induction’) and versions of structural realism were advanced in response to them. Significantly\, the history of science and various forms of invariance were appealed to by participants in order to defend a realist conception of science. \nSPEAKER PROFILE\n\n\nStathis Psillos received his PhD in Philosophy of Science in 1994 from King’s College London. Between 1993 and 1998 he was initially assistant editor and subsequently deputy editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Between 1995 and 1998\, he was a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow\, at the Dept of Philosophy\, Logic and Scientific Method\, London School of Economics. Since 1998\, he has been a Research Associate of the Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences\, London School of Economics. He joined the Dept of Philosophy and History of Science in the University of Athens\, Greece\, in 1999. He was among the founders of European Philosophy of Science Association and served as its first elected President (2007-2009). He is currently the editor of the journal Metascience.  \nRead more about Stathis Psillos. \n \nVIDEO
URL:https://www.rotman.uwo.ca/event/stathis-psillos-revisiting-bankruptcy-science-debate/
LOCATION:Ontario
CATEGORIES:Philosophy of Science,Stathis Psillos
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20140128T083000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20140128T100000
DTSTAMP:20260404T064207
CREATED:20170819T173750Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200608T163132Z
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SUMMARY:Douglas Kutach: Empirical Fundamentalism
DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT\n\nThe program is built on two main ideas. First\, metaphysics should be understood primarily in term of a certain concept of fundamental reality. The fundamental/derivative distinction is meant to replace a variety of competitors such as the reality/appearance distinction\, the objective/subjective distinction\, the scientific and manifest image\, the realism/anti-realism distinction\, and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Second\, a concept should analyzed in terms of experiments that reveal why the concept is valuable. I will illustrate how Empirical Fundamentalism resolves problems in the metaphysics of causation. \nSPEAKER PROFILE\n\n\nDouglas Kutach is a 2014 Visiting Fellow of Western University. He is the founder of Empirical Fundamentalism\, a philosophical program that exploits a distinctive conception of fundamentality and the method of empirical analysis in order to pronounce on a range of traditional philosophical problems. His recent book (August 2013) Causation and Its Basis in Fundamental Physics applies this program to causation. His articles within this program also address modality\, natural kinds\, reductive identities\, the passage of time\, and the epistemic “arrow of time”.Read more about Kutach here. \nRead more about Douglas Kutach.
URL:https://www.rotman.uwo.ca/event/douglas-kutach-empirical-fundamentalism/
LOCATION:Room 1145 – Stevenson Hall\, Stevenson Hall\, Room 1145\, London\, Ontario\, N6G 2V4\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Philosophy of Science
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