Tim Bayne 2017-09-07T13:21:47+00:00

Project Description

RESEARCH AREAS:

  • Philosophy of Mind

  • Cognitive Science

  • Consciousness

CONTACT:

TIM BAYNE

Professor; Endowed Chair – Philosophy of Neuroscience;
Department of Philosophy, Western University

Tim Bayne is a philosopher of mind and cognitive science, with a particular interest in the nature of consciousness. One focus of current research concerns the measurement of consciousness, and the question of whether we can identify well-grounded ways of detecting consciousness in brain-damaged individuals, infants and non-human animals. A second focus of current research concerns the ways in which the structural features of consciousness (such as its unity) can guide the search for a plausible account of its neural basis. A third focus of Tim’s research concerns the notion of a ‘level of consciousness’. Although the phrase is a common, the notion of a level of consciousness is obscure, and it is far from clear what a level of consciousness is meant to be. Tim is currently developing an account of levels of consciousness that attempts to do justice to the various ways in which this notion is employed in the science of consciousness. Tim also works on a number of issues in the philosophy of psychiatry, exploring questions relating to the etiology of delusions and the nature of psychiatric kinds.

My research engages with a variety of issues that fall at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and the sciences of the mind.

One research focus concerns the epistemology of consciousness. Here I am interested in the question of how robust measures of consciousness might be identified. I have been collaborating with Prof. Nicholas Shea (King’s College, London) to explore the projects of the “natural kind” approach for studying consciousness. The natural kind approach treats consciousness as a natural kind, and recommends that the search for objective measures of consciousness be modeled on the search for objective measures of other natural kinds (such as gold and hepatitis). Addressing the questions raised by the natural kind approach requires engaging with a number of issues in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of language. Of particular relevance here are questions about how the epistemology of 3rd -person access to consciousness should be related the epistemology of 1st-person access to consciousness. Philosophers have traditionally taken 1st-person access to be privileged over 3rd-person access, but the natural kind approach threatens to undermine this assumption.

A second research focus concerns the ways in which the structural features of consciousness can guide the search for a plausible account of its neural basis. Previous work of mine has focused on the ways in which the unity of consciousness constrains theories of consciousness (The Unity of Consciousness, OUP). My current research focuses on ways in which accounts of the admissible contents of consciousness can be used to evaluate theories of consciousness. Here, I am particularly interested in high-level perceptual content, the nature of conscious thought, and the question of whether there is a distinctive kind of cognitive phenomenology.

A third research focus concerns the notion of a level of consciousness. Although much of the science of consciousness has focused on fine-grained contents of consciousness, it is increasingly clear that a full understanding of consciousness needs to reckon with the fact that consciousness can take the form of various ‘levels’. But although levels talk is now ubiquitous in consciousness science, it has received little systematic analysis. Together with Professor Jakob Hohwy (Monash) and Adrian Owen (BMI, Western) I am examining how the notion of a level of consciousness is understood in the science of consciousness, and how theories of consciousness ought to accommodate the various levels of consciousness.

I have also contributed to a number of debates in the philosophy of psychiatry, focusing in particular on the nature and etiology of delusion.

Books

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Bayne, T. (under contract). The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. London: Routledge.

Bayne, T. (under contract). The Philosophy of Religion: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: OUP.

Bayne, T. 2013. Thought: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: OUP. (Translations forthcoming in: Arabic, Korean, Swedish, Vietnamese)

Bayne, T. 2010. The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press (xi + 341 pages). (Reviewed in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Analysis Reviews, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, Times Literary Supplement; Symposia in Analysis Reviews and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research).

Edited Collections

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Bayne, T. & Montague, M. 2011. Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (378 pages) (Reviewed in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Mind)

Bayne, T., Cleeremans, A. & Wilken, P. (eds.) 2009. The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press (672 pages)

Bayne, T. & Fernández, J. (eds.) 2008. Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation. Hove: Psychology Press (300 pages)

 

Journal Articles and Chapters

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  1. Bayne, T. Forthcoming. ‘Flying Solo’: Delusions, Dreams, and Doxastic Solipsism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
  2. Bayne, T. In press. Delusions and the norms of rationality. In T-W Hung & T. Lane (Eds) Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. Elsevier.
  3. Bayne, T. & Hohwy, J. In press. Modes of consciousness. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics and Law of Severe Brain Damage. New York: OUP, pp. 57-80.
  4. Hohwy, J. & Bayne, T. 2015. The neural correlates of consciousness: causes, confounds and constituents. In S. Miller (ed.)The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness,Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 155-76.
  5. Bayne, T. 2015. Introspection and Intuition: A Response to Engel. In T. Metzinger & J. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. 1-3.
  6. Bayne, T. 2015. Introspective insecurity. In T. Metzinger & J. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. 1-18.
  7. Bayne, T. 2014. Reply to Commentators. Analysis Reviews, 74/3: 520-9.
  8. Bayne, T. 2014. Summary of “The Unity of Consciousness”, Analysis Reviews, 488-90.
  9. Bayne, T & Hohwy, J. 2014. Global disorders of consciousness. WIRE’s Cognitive Science, 5: 129-138.
  10. Bayne, T. 2014. The multisensory nature of perceptual consciousness. In D. Bennett & C. Hill (eds). Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  11. Spence, C. & Bayne, T. 2014. Is consciousness multisensory? In D. Stokes, S. Biggs and M. Matthen (eds.) Perception and its Modalities. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 95-132.
  12. Bayne, T. 2013. Neural decoding and human freedom. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.) Moral Psychology: Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 177-82.
  13. 53. Bayne, T. & Hattiangadi, A. 2013. Belief and its bedfellows. In N. Nottelmann (ed.) New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 124-44.
  14. Bayne, T. 2013. Replies to Commentators, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86/1: 224-30.
  15. Bayne, T. 2013. Précis of ‘The Unity of Consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86/1: 200-208.
  16. Bayne, T. & Hohwy, J. 2013. Consciousness: Theoretical approaches. In A. E. Cavanna, A. Nani, H. Blumenfeld & S. Laureys (Eds) The Neuroimaging of Consciousness. Springer, pp. 23-35.
  17. Bayne, T. 2013. Agency as a marker of consciousness. In T. Vierkant, J. Kiverstein and A. Clark (Eds.) Decomposing the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 160-80.
  18. Perkins, R. & Bayne, T. 2013. Representationalism and the problem of vagueness. Philosophical Studies, 162 (1): 71-86.
  19. Bayne, T. 2012. How to read minds. In S. Edwards, S. Richmond & G. Rees (eds.) I Know What you are Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 41-58.
  20. Bayne, T. 2011. Libet and the case for free will scepticism. In R. Swinburne (ed.) Free Will and Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-46.
  21. Bayne, T. & Montague, M. 2011. Cognitive phenomenology: An introduction. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.) Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-34.
  22. Bayne, T. 2011. The presence of consciousness in ‘absence’ seizures, Behavioural Neurology, 24/1: 47-53.
  23. Bayne, T. 2010. Delusions as doxastic states: contexts, compartments and commitments, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 17/4: 329-36. (invited commentary)
  24. Bayne, T. 2010. Agentive experiences as pushmi-pullyu representations. In J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff and K. Frankish (eds.) New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 219-36.
  25. Bayne, T. 2010. In defense of genethical parity. In D. Archard and D. Benatar (eds.) Creating Humans: The Ethics of Procreation and Parenthood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 31-56.
  26. Shea, N. & Bayne, T. 2010. The vegetative state and the science of consciousness, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61: 459-84.
  27. Bayne, T. 2010. The sense of agency. In F. Macpherson (ed.) The Senses. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 355-374.
  28. Bayne, T. & Spener, M. 2010. Introspective humility. In E. Sosa and E. Villanueva (eds.) Philosophical Issues, 20: 1-22.
  29. Langdon, R. & Bayne, T. 2010. Delusion and confabulation: Mistakes of seeing, remembering and believing. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15, 1/2/3: 319-45. Reprinted in R. Langdon and M. Turner (eds). 2010. Delusion and Confabulation. Hove: Psychology Press.
  30. Bayne, T. 2009. Perception and the reach of phenomenal content. Philosophical Quarterly, 59: 385-404. Reprinted in Macpherson, F. and Hawley, K. (forthcoming) (eds.) The Admissible Contents of Experience, Oxford: Blackwell.
  31. Bayne, T. & Fernández, J. 2009. Delusion and self-deception: Mapping the terrain. In T. Bayne & J. Fernández (eds.) Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation. Psychology Press, pp. 1-20.
  32. Bayne, T. 2008. The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome, The Journal of Philosophy, 105(6): 277-300.
  33. Bayne, T. 2008. The phenomenology of agency, Philosophy Compass, 3: 1-21.
  34. Bayne, T. & Restall, G. 2008. A participatory model of the atonement. In Y. Nagasawa and E. Wielenberg (eds). New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave, pp. 150-166.
  35. Bayne, T. 2007. Conscious states and conscious creatures: explanation in the scientific study of consciousness, Philosophical Perspectives 21 (Philosophy of Mind): 1-22.
  36. Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. 2007. Narrators and comparators: The architecture of agentive self-awareness, Synthese, 159: 475-91.
  37. Bayne, T. & Nagasawa, Y. 2007. The grounds of worship again: A reply to Crowe. Religious Studies, 43: 475-80.
  38. Bayne, T. 2007. The unity of consciousness: a cartography, In M. Marraffa, M. de Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.) Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 201-10.
  39. Bayne, T. 2007. Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness. In G. Jamieson (ed) Hypnosis and Conscious States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 93-109.
  40. Bayne, T. & Nagasawa, Y. 2006. The grounds of worship, Religious Studies, 42: 299-313.
  41. Pacherie, E., Green, M. & Bayne, T. 2006. Phenomenology and delusions: who put the ‘alien’ in alien control?, Consciousness and Cognition, 15: 566-77.
  42. Bayne, T. & Levy, N. 2006. The feeling of doing: deconstructing the phenomenology of agency. In N. Sebanz and W. Prinz (eds.) Disorders of Volition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (pp. 49-68).
  43. Bayne, T. 2006. Phenomenology and the feeling of doing: Wegner on the conscious will, In S. Pockett, W. P. Banks and S. Gallagher (eds.) Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 169-186.
  44. Dainton, B. & Bayne, T. 2005. Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83/4: 549-71.
  45. Bayne, T. & Fernández, J. 2005. Resisting ruthless reductionism: a commentary on Bickle, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4: 239-48.
  46. Bayne, T. 2005. Divided brains & unified phenomenology: An essay on Michael Tye’s “Consciousness and Persons” Philosophical Psychology, 18/4: 495-512.
  47. Bayne, T. & Levy, N. 2005. Amputees by choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the ethics of amputation, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22/1: 75-86.
  48. Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. 2005. In defence of the doxastic account of delusions. Mind & Language, 20/2: 163-88.
  49. Levy, N. & Bayne, T. 2004. A will of one’s own: consciousness, control and character, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27: 459-70.
  50. Bayne, T. 2004. Closing the gap? Some questions for neurophenomenology, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3/4: 349-64.
  51. Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. 2004a. Bottom-up or top-down?: Campbell’s rationalist account of monothematic delusions, Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 11/1: 1-11.
  52. Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. 2004b. Experience, belief, & the interpretive fold, Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 11/1: 81-86.
  53. Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. 2004c. L’approcio empirista al delirio: un chiarimento e una difesa. Sistemi Intelligenti, 16/2: 223-236.
  54. Bayne, T. 2004. Phenomenal holism, internalism, and the neural correlates of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11/1: 32-37.
  55. Bayne, T. 2004. Self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness, The Monist, 87/2: 224-241.
  56. Levy, N. & Bayne, T. 2004. Doing without deliberation: automatism, automaticity, and moral accountability, International Review of Psychiatry, 16/4: 209-15.
  57. Bayne, T. 2003. Gamete donation and parental responsibility, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 20/1: 77-87.
  58. Bayne, T. & Kolers, A. 2003. Toward a pluralist account of parenthood, Bioethics, 17/3: 221-42.
  59. Bayne, T. 2003. Inclusion and incarnation: A reply to sturch, Religious Studies, 39/1: 107-109.
  60. Bayne, T. & Chalmers, D. 2003. What is the unity of consciousness?, In A. Cleeremans (ed.) The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23-58.
  61. Bayne, T. 2001. Moral status and the treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 27/1: 87-105.
  62. Kolers, A. & Bayne, T. 2001. “Are you my mommy?”: On the genetic basis of parenthood, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18/3: 273-286.
  63. Bayne, T. 2001. Chalmers on the justification of phenomenal judgments, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXII: 407-19.
  64. Bayne, T. 2001. The inclusion model of the incarnation: problems and prospects, Religious Studies, 37: 141-157.
  65. Bayne, T. 2000. The unity of consciousness: clarification and defense, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 248-254.

Encyclopedia and Handbook Entries

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  1. Peterson, A. & Bayne, T. Under contract. End-of-life ethical issues: Consciousness, coma, and the vegetative state. In R. Gennaro (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Consciousness.
  2. Bayne, T. Under contract. Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.
  3. Bayne, T. In press. Free will and the phenomenology of agency. In M. Griffith, K. Timpe and N. Levy (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge (6,000 words).
  4. Bayne, T. & Spence, C. 2015. Multisensory perception. In M. Matthen (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York: OUP, pp. 603-20.
  5. Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. 2014. Consciousness and agency. In J. Clausen & N. Levy (ed.) Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer, pp. 211-30.
  6. Bayne, T. 2013. The disunity of consciousness in psychiatric disorders. In K.W.M. Fulford, M. Davies, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini and T. Thornton (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: OUP, pp. 673-88.
  7. Bayne, T. 2013. Potential persons (3,000 words) and Wrongful life (3,000 words). In H. LaFollette (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  8. Bayne, T. 2009. ‘Access consciousness’, ‘Delusions’, ‘Functions of consciousness’, ‘The unity of consciousness’, In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds) The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: OUP.
  9. Bayne, T. 2009. Consciousness. In J. Symons & P. Calvo (eds) Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge, pp. 477-94.
  10. Bayne, T. & Kolers, A. 2002 (substantially rev’d 2006). (with Avery Kolers) Parenthood and procreation, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/parenthood/.
  11. Bayne, T. 2002. The unity of consciousness, (ed. L. Nadel) Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group, pp. 786-93.

 

Book Reviews and Other Publications

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  1. ‘Thought’, New Scientist, 21 September, pp. 31-37.
  2. (with Aaron Henry) Review of Chis Mole “Attention is Cognitive Unison,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91/1: 199-202.
  3. ‘Make your mind up’ Review of Alfred Mele “Effective Intentions” and Richard Holton “Willing, Wanting, Waiting” Times Literary Supplement, 5613 (October 29): 30.
  4. ‘Definitely Red’, Review of Russell T. Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel “Describing Inner Experience?: Proponent Meets Skeptic” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), Times Literary Supplement, 5490 (June 20): 30.
  5. Review of D. Dennett “Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84/1: 140-42.
  6. Review of P. Helm (ed) “Referring to God: Jewish and Christian Philosophical and Theological Perspectives”, Faith and Philosophy, 20/1: 110-113.
  7. Review of D. M. Wegner, “The Illusion of Conscious Will” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9/7: 94-96.
  8. Review of B. Dainton, “Stream of Consciousness” (London: Routledge), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8: 79-92.
  9. Review of Charles Siewert “The Significance of Consciousness” (Princeton: Princeton University Press) and William Seager “Theories of Consciousness” (London: Routledge), Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus Philosophiques, XX: pp. 217-221.
  10. Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff “Words, Thoughts and Theories” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus Philosophiques, Vol. XV: pp. 254-56.

Presentations

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29 October 2015: Flying Solo: Delusion, Dreams, and Doxastic Solipsism, 17th International Conference on Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology (INPP), Frutillar Chile

22 October 2015: Can we Build a Consciousness Meter? 1-day Philosophy of Mind Workshop, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile

16 October 2015: Can we Build a Consciousness Meter? University of Auckland, New Zealand

14 October 2015: Can we Build a Consciousness Meter? Victoria University, New Zealand

September-October: Three Erskine Lectures, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

16 September, 2015: How to build a consciousness meter, Philosophy Department Seminar, The Australian National University.

8 July 2015: What is a Level of Consciousness?, Symposium on Levels of Consciousness, Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Paris

13 June 2015: Probing Consciousness in the Vegetative State: Challenges and Opportunities, Symposium on Consciousness in the Vegetative State, Towards a Science of Consciousness, Helsinki

26 May 2015: Implicit Cognition in the Vegetative State, The Implicit Mind: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives on Implicit Cognition, University of Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm

2 April 2015: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology, Departmental Seminar, The University of Stirling

11 March 2015: Neuroimaging and the Philosophy of Mind: From Reverse Inference to the New Eliminativism, Workshop on the Philosophical Implications of Neuroimaging, Institute of Philosophy, The University of London

5 March 2015: The Scrutability of Subjectivity, Conference on Objectivity, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu City, Taiwan

9 January 2015: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology, Mind Network Meeting, University of Bergen

10 December 2014: Gist!, Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, Monash University

25 October 2014: Measuring Consciousness: The Natural Kind Method, Measuring Consciousness in Borderline States, New York University

1 October 2014: Beyond Eliminativism?: Functional Neuroimaging and the Future of Intentionality, Conference on Dimensions of Intentionality, Ruhr-Universität Bochum

14 August 2014: Flying Solo: Delusions, Rationality, and the Social Nature of Belief, IEAS Conference on Reason and Rationality, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan

29 June 2014: Gamete Donation: Can Parental Rights and Duties be Transferred?, Workshop on the Ethics of Gamete Donation and Information Sharing, Meeting of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology, Munich

23 June 2014: The Nature of Delusions, Philosophy of Psychiatry Workshop, University of Lancaster

18 June 2014: Introspective Insecurity, Department of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabruck

13 June 2014: The Nature of Delusions, Psychosis Group, University of Liverpool

16 May 2014: Paradigms of Phenomenality, Workshop on the work of Ned Block, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris

10 May 2014: Reflections on Multisensory Awareness, Workshop on Multisensory Perception, University of Toronto

25 April 2014: Introspective Insecurity, CUNY Graduate Student Workshop, Keynote Talk

12 March 2014: The Phenomenology of Freedom, Workshop on the Phenomenology of Agency, University of Antwerp

7 February 2014: Perceptual Gist, Department of Philosophy, Monash University

25 November 2013: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology, Workshop on Cognitive Phenomenology, University of Fribourg

22 November 2013: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario

29 August 2013: Phenomenal Attitudes, Workshop on Imperatival Aspects of Perceptual Experience, CSMN, University of Oslo

25 August 2013: The Unity of Consciousness as a Constraint on Theories of Consciousness, Workshop on the Unity of Consciousness, University of Bergen

22 August 2013: The Science of Consciousness: A Philosophical Perspective, Consciousness in the Brain Workshop, University of Bergen

18 July 2013: The Disunity of Consciousness in Psychiatric Disorders, Summer School in Philosophy of Psychiatry, University of Oxford

17 June 2013: Disagreement about the Phenomenology of Free Will, Workshop on the Phenomenology of Free Will, Fribourg University

15 June 2013: Disagreement about the Phenomenology of Free Will, LSE Workshop on Free Will

12 April 2013: Multisensory Perceptual Objects, LOGOS, University of Barcelona

27 March 2013: Reply to Commentators, ‘Author meets Critics’ session on the Unity of Consciousness, Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco.

24 January 2013: The Case for Consciousness in Non-Responsive Minds, Workshop on ‘Finding Consciousness’, Duke University

16 January 2013: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology, Symposium on ‘what it’s likeness’, Lund University, Sweden

15 January 2013: Brain-reading, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden

17 December 2012: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology, Workshop on the Naturalization of Mind and Modality, The University of Girona

11 October 2012: Belief and its Bedfellows, Keynote talk at Graduate Student Conference, Edinburgh

9 October 2012: Belief and its Bedfellows, Departmental Seminar, Central European University

2 July 2012: The Unity of Consciousness, Keynote Address, Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, University of Sussex

25 April 2012: Brain-reading, Departmental Seminar, Oxford Brookes University

29 March, 2012: Epilepsy and the Architecture of Consciousness, 2nd International Congress on Epilepsy, Brain and Mind, Prague.

9 March 2012: Brain-reading, Monash University

23 February 2012: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology, Philosophy Department, National Chung Cheng University

22 February 2012: Consciousness in the Vegetative State, National Chengchi University (Taipei)

22 February 2012: Brain-reading, Psychology Department, National Taiwan University

21 February 2012: Brain-reading, Taipei Medical University

15 January 2012: The Functions of Perceptual Awareness, ‘Big Questions in Free Will’ Workshop, Tallahassee Florida

12 January 2012: The Problem of Cognitive Phenomenology, Mind and Perception Group, Rice University

January 2012: Six talks at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tokyo

30 December 2011: Unity, Disunity and the Split-Brain, Symposium on the Split-Brain: American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division)

16 December 2011: The Unity of Consciousness and Multisensory Integration, Workshop on Sensory Integration and Perception, Monash University

2 December 2011: Belief and its Bedfellows, Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Language, Maison Francaise, d’Oxford

5 November 2011: Building Blocks or Unified Fields: How Should we Model the Structure of Consciousness?, Workshop on the Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration, Brown University

6 October 2011: Building Blocks or Unified Fields: How should we Model the Structure of Consciousness?, Thumos Seminar, University of Geneva

5 April 2011: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Queen’s University Belfast

3 April 2011: Neuroimaging and the Study of Consciousness, Workshop: Imaging the Mind, University of Amsterdam

19 November 2010: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Workshop: Belief, Feeling and Emotions, University of Geneva

8 November 2010: The Unity of Consciousness, Forum for European Philosophy: Re-Visions, London School of Economics

31 October 2010: Belief and its Bedfellows, ProDoc Doctoral Program Workshop: Mind, Normativity, Self, and Properties, Villars Switzerland

18 October 2010: Belief and its Bedfellows, Conference on Belief, University of Southern Denmark (Keynote)

8 October 2010: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Bristol University Philosophy Seminar

7 October 2010: Consciousness and the Problem of Other Minds, Public Lecture, The University of Antwerp

3 July 2010: Decisions, Decisions, British Academy Symposium on Free Will, Senate House, London

14 May 2010: Comments on Richard Holton’s ‘Finding space for an addict’s self-control’, Workshop on Self-Control and Addiction, University of Oxford

2 April 2010: The Structure of Agentive Awareness, American Philosophical Association: Pacific Division (Invited Session)

18 March 2010: Agentive Experiences as Pushmi-Pullyu States and Agency as a Marker of Consciousness, University of Leiden

14 January 2010: Introspective Humility, Workshop on Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Centre for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen

17 December 2009, Introspective Humility, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo

16 December 2009, The Structure of Agentive Experience, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo

3 December 2009, The Structure of Agentive Experience, Departmental Seminar, University of Geneva

21 November 2009: Comments on Stuart Crutchfield’s “Can we Experience Empty Space?”, 13th Annual Oxford Philosophy Graduate Conference

31 October 2009: Comments on Patrick Haggard’s “More than Skin Deep: Body Representation Beyond Primary Somatosensory Cortex”, Workshop on Perception, Action and the Self, New York University

9 October 2009: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh

28 August 2009: The Case for Consciousness in the Vegetative State, Symposium on Consciousness in the Vegetative state, ESPP, Budapest

29 July 2009: Delusions and In-between Believings, Workshop on Emotion and Perception, University of Geneva

9 July 2009: The Structure of Agentive Experience, Graduate Conference: The Varieties of Experience (Keynote Speaker) University of Glasgow

19 June 2009: Counting Experiences, Workshop on the Senses, Institut Jean-Nicod

28 May 2009: From Dysconnection to Delusion, St Cross Philosophy of Psychiatry Symposium, St. Cross College, Oxford

7 May9: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London

28 April 2009: The Unity of Consciousness, The Centre for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Sussex

17 April 2009: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, New York University

15 April 2009: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, McGill University

27 March 2009: The Vegetative State and the Problem of Other Minds, Workshop on Consciousness in the Vegetative State, The Australian National University

17 March 2009: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Department of Philosophy Seminar Series, National University of Singapore

29 October 2008: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Department of Philosophy Seminar Series, York University

22 October 2008: The Unity of Consciousness, Consciousness, Neurophilosophy and Brain Imaging, University of Pavia

14 October 2008: The Geography of Genethics and the Ends of Life, Department of Philosophy Seminar Series, University of Hull.

29 June 2008: Agency as a Marker of Consciousness, Conference on Agency, Consciousness and Will, University of Edinburgh.

27 June 2008: Comments on Dave Ward, “The Agent in Magenta”, Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context Essay Competition, University of Edinburgh

27 June 2008: Comments on Adrian Smith “Acting on Bodily Experience”, Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context Essay Competition, University of Edinburgh

22 June 2008: Delusions and Consciousness: An Overview, Symposium on Delusions and Consciousness, Annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Taipei

19 June 2008: Conscious States and Consciousness Creatures: Explanatory Strategies in the Science of Consciousness, Tutorial Presentation, Annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Taipei (with Jakob Hohwy)

18 June 2008: The Unity of Consciousness: II, National Chengchi University (Taipei), Center for Science, Technology and Human Values

16 June 2008: The Unity of Consciousness: I, National Taiwan University, Department of Philosophy

4 June 2008: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Workshop on Defining Thoughts, Bochum, Germany

1 May 2008: Consciousness and its Markers, Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Science, University of Sheffield

24 April 2008: Consciousness and its Markers, Université Libre de Bruxelles

13 April 2008: On the Connection between Consciousness and Agency, Conscious Process and Free Action: A Templeton Foundation Humble Approach Initiative, Amelia Island, Florida

8 April 2008: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, Arizona

8 April 2008: The Unity of Consciousness, Tutorial Presentation, Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson Arizona.

29 January 2008: The Geography of Genethics and the ends of Life, Department of Philosophy Seminar Series, University College, Cork.

22 January 2008: Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: A Framework, Workshop on Explaining Consciousness, University of Aarhus.

14 January 2008: The Intentional Structure of Agentive Experience, University of Konstanz

14 December 2007: Hurley on the Unity of Consciousness, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol.

1 December 2007: The Reach of Phenomenal Consciousness, MindGrad (Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy of Mind), Warwick University (keynote speaker).

29 November 2007: Consciousness, the Self, and the Split-Brain Syndrome, Conference on Mental Unity and Self, Centre for Subjectivity Research, Copenhagen.

15 November 2007: Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanatory Strategies in the Science of Consciousness, Molecules to Mind: 5th Vienna Biocenter PhD Symposium, Vienna (keynote speaker)

25 October 2007: Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanatory Strategies in the Science of Consciousness, Distinguished Speaker Series, Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt Graduate School

17 October 2007: Closure and Consistency: The Structure of Consciousness, Department of Philosophy, University of Manchester

24 August 2007: Closure and Consistency: The Structure of Consciousness, Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide

24 June 2007: Phenomenal States and Phenomenal Systems, Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Las Vegas

7 June 2007: Consciousness and Agency, Second Summer School on Consciousness (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), Cargèse, Corsica

4 April 2007: Narrators and Comparators: Agency and the Architecture of Self-Ascription, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Macquarie University

26 March 2007: The Phenomenal Fringe as the Thin Edge of the Wedge, University of Birmingham

21 March 2007: The Phenomenal Fringe as the Thin Edge of the Wedge, Conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience, Glasgow University

13 March 2007: Narrators and Comparators: Agency and the Architecture of Self-Ascription, Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, London (with Elisabeth Pacherie)

3 March 2007: Narrators and comparators: Agency and the Architecture of Self-Ascription, Workshop “Understanding Delusions”, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris

23 November 2006: Consciousness and Moral Agency, Neuroethics workshop, University of Melbourne

21 October 2006: A Perceptual Model of the Phenomenology of Agency, Workshop on Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp (with Elisabeth Pacherie)

9 May 2006: The Geography of Genethics and the Ends of Life, Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga.

21 April 2006: A Perceptual Model of the Phenomenology of Agency, University of Queensland.

20 April 2006: A Perceptual Model of the Phenomenology of Agency, Workshop on the work of David Velleman, the Australian National University

9 February 2006: The Unity of Consciousness and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness, RSSS, the Australian National University

28 July 2005: The Split-brain Syndrome and the Unity of Consciousness, SPAWN (Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network)

26 June 2005: Consciousness and Attention in the Split-Brain, Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Caltech

25 June 2004: Tutorial on the Unity of Consciousness, Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Antwerp

23 January 2004: Delusions: Beliefs or Imaginings?, RSSS, The Australian National University

2 October 2003: Moral Responsibility: Learning from Pathologies of Agency (with Neil Levy), 28th International Congress on Law and Mental Health, Sydney

1 September 2003: Delusions: Beliefs or Imaginings?, Department of Philosophy, Sydney University

7 August 2003: Deconstructing the Global Workspace: Reason, Reportability, and the Rational Control of Behavior, Themes from Ned Block, the Australian National University

14 July 2003: Delusions: Believings or Imaginings? (with Elisabeth Pacherie), International Cognitive Science Conference, Sydney

9 July 2003: Delusions: Believings or Imaginings? (with Elisabeth Pacherie), European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Turin

15 March 2003: Non-existence and a Life Worth Living, Conference on Regret, University of Sydney

11 March 2003: This Woman is not my Wife: Meaning, Rationality and the Capgras Delusion (with Elisabeth Pacherie), Philosophy Department, Macquarie University

13 August 2002: Creating Amy: Some Problems in the Morality of Bringing People into Existence, Philosophy Department, Macquarie University

13 June 2002: The Unity of Consciousness, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University

1 June 2002: Disunified Access to a Unified Consciousness?, Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Barcelona

7 October 2001: Is Consciousness Unified?, University of Victoria, New Zealand

12 August 2001: Is Consciousness Unified?, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

1 July 2000: What is the Unity of Consciousness?, Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels (poster)

28 December 1999: Abortion and the Immorality of Killing: How Far Back Do I Go?, Conference on Applied Ethics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.

3 December 1999: Introspection, Ownership, and the Synchronic Unity of the Self, AAP-NZ Philosophy Conference, Dunedin, New Zealand.

2 December 1999: Euthanasia: Taking Autonomy Seriously, Bioethics Day, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

5 August 1999: Three Notions of Embodiment, Fifth International Conference on Personhood, Santa Fe, NM

19 June 1999: The Sole Object of Bodily Awareness?, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Stanford University, California (poster)

6 June 1999: Where is the Conscious Mind?: HOT Theories of Consciousness and Vehicle Externalism, Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, University of Ontario, London, Canada

25 May 1999: Where is the Conscious Mind?: HOT Theories of Consciousness and Vehicle Externalism, Toward a Science of Consciousness: Fundamental Approaches, Tokyo, Japan (poster)

11 April 1999: The Sole Object of Bodily Awareness?, Enigmas of the Ideal, Stonybrook SUNY, New York

4 March 1999: Comments on Ralph Wedgwood’s “The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism”, Pacific Meeting of the APA

17 February 1999: Comments on Michael Patton’s “Strict Personal Identity and its Discontents”, MidSouth Conference, Memphis TN

 

Graduate Teaching: Supervision

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Doctoral Supervision: Andrew Routledge (Ph.D awarded 2015); Peter Forrest (2011-2015); Marius Dumitru: 2009-2011; Chuanfei Chin (2010-2011)

MPhil (Mind and Action): Simona Aimar (Hilary 2010)

BPhil Thesis Supervision: Henry Shevlin (2009-2010); Patrick Butlin (2009-2010); Jamie Hanson (2010-2011); Peter Forrest (2010-2011)

BPhil Paper (‘Mind and Action’) Supervision: Jens Ziska (MT 2007); Nicole Krzys (MT 2008); Ben Plommer (HT 2009); Patrick Butlin (TT 2009); David Matthers (HT 2010); Jamie Hanson (HT 2010); Brandon Ashby (MT 2010); Aaron Henry (TT 2011)

Oliver Granger, MA (Hons), Macquarie University (2003-2007)

Kevin Sinclair, MA (Hons), Macquarie University (2003-2007)

Graduate Teaching: Seminars

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University of Manchester

Graduate Seminar in Philosophy of Mind (2012-2013; 2013-2014)

University of Oxford

BPhil Philosophy of Mind and Action Seminar (2010-2011; 2011-2012)

Content and Consciousness in Decision and Action (2008, w/ Dr. Nicholas Shea)

Foundational Issues in Consciousness and Content (2008, w/ Dr. Nicholas Shea)

Consciousness (2007, w/ Prof. Martin Davies)

The Unity of Consciousness (2007)

Macquarie University

Honours course on life and death (2003)

University of Canterbury

Philosophy of Mind (2000, w/ Prof. Cynthia Macdonald)

Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2001, w/ Prof. Jack Copeland)

 

Undergraduate Teaching

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University of Manchester (2012-present): Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Psychology

University of Oxford (2007-2012, yearly in both tutorial and lecture form): Philosophy of Cognitive Science; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Religion

Macquarie University (2002-2004): Critical Thinking; Practical Ethics; Epistemology; Philosophy of Religion; Philosophy of Cognitive Science

University of Canterbury (2000-2001): Epistemology; Intermediate Logic; Philosophy of Art; Philosophy of Religion

University of Arizona (1998-1999): Introduction to Philosophy; Philosophy of Science, Medical Ethics