Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Psychology
Department of Philosophy, Western University
I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Western University. I completed an MA in Philosophy here at Western in 2011. My current interests revolve around topics in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of perception, and moral philosophy. The focus of my current research is on representational theories of consciousness. Specifically, I am working to develop a representational account of normative and evaluative experiences, with specific emphasis on the normative and evaluative components of bodily experience and of moods.
I began my philosophical career at York University in Toronto where I completed a BA in Philosophy and Urban Studies. In my MA project I explored and attempted to resolve the tensions that arise in libertarian theories of free will when such theories try to explain how human action can be both undetermined and controlled. I continue to have a longstanding interest in the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. Partly, my interest in free will concerns when we ought judge someone’s actions qua moral agent and when we ought to take what Strawson has called the “objective attitude” toward them. When should we judge an agent to be in control of her actions and how does this relate to issues of responsibility and desert?
My current research is concerned with the nature of consciousness and the viability of representational theories of consciousness. I am currently developing a representational account of normative and evaluative experiences, with specific emphasis on the normative and evaluative components of bodily experience and of moods. In my view, bodily experiences and moods present a specific challenge to representational theories of consciousness because of their normative and evaluative components. My goal is to provide a novel account of evaluative and normative experience that will demonstrate that these experiences can be accounted for by the representationalist.
Conference Presentations and Commentaries
“Strong Representationalism and the Experience of Pain” presented at the Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, University of Victoria, June 2013.
Commentary on “How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Uninstantiated Concepts” by Eric Sampson (University of Wisconsin–Madison). 11th Annual PhilMiLCog Graduate Philosophy Conference, The University of Western Ontario, May 2013.
“Strong Representationalism and the Experience of Pain” presented at the Essays of Significance Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Windsor, March 2013.
Commentary on “Probabilizing the End” by Jacob Stegenga (University of Toronto). Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, University of Waterloo, May 2012.
Commentary on “Interpersonal Frege Cases and the Publicity Constraint” by Gerardo Viera (University of British Columbia). 9th Annual PhilMiLCog Graduate Philosophy Conference, The University of Western Ontario, May 2011.