Department of Philosophy, Western University
Catherine Stinson is a philosopher of science with interests in neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, and computational science. Her main interest is how scientific explanations work: How can we be sure that experimental models behave the same way as the systems they stand in for? Are computational models more like experiments run on a digital model, or like a series of calculations? How can we relate the personal, cognitive, neural, and molecular level explanations of a complex psychiatric disorder? One project Catherine is working on at the Rotman Institute is coming up with an account of what sort of a thing an explanation is that can make sense of the diverse and overlapping explanations (at multiple levels, coming from various types of models) that we use to understand a given scientific phenomenon.
Stinson, C. (Forthcoming in 2018) “Explanation and Connectionist Models.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Eds. M. Colombo, M. Sprevak. PDF draft
Stinson, C. & J. Sullivan, (2017) “Mechanistic Explanation in Neuroscience.” In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. Eds. S. Glennan, P. Illari. PDF
Stinson, C. (2017) “Back to the Cradle: Mechanism Schemata from Piaget to DNA.” In Eppur si muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer. Eds. M. Adams, Z. Biener, U. Feest, J. Sullivan. Springer. PDF
Piryankova, I.V., Wong, H.Y., Linkenauger, S., Stinson, C., Longo, M., Bülthoff, H.H., Mohler, B.J. (2014). “Owning an Overweight or Underweight Body: Distinguishing the Physical, Experienced and Virtual Body”. PLOS One 9(8): e103428. JOURNAL WEBSITE
Stinson, C. (2009). “Searching for The Source of Executive Attention”. PSYCHE 15(1): 137-154. JOURNAL WEBSITE
Cognitive Mechanisms and Computational Models: Explanation in Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of Science, 2013
Adaptive Information Filtering with Labeled and Unlabeled Data, University of Toronto, Department of Computer Science, 2002
“Computational Models as Generic Mechanisms”, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, University of Munich, May 2014
“Are ‘Computational Experiments’ Experiments?”, Philosophy Department, York University, April 2014
“Is Explanation in Psychology Mechanistic?”, Explaining Mental Phenomena, University of Tübingen, July 2012
“Epistemology of Computational Modeling in the Social Sciences”, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Kiel, May 2012
“What Mechanisms Can Do (for You)”, Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen, December 2011
“Searching for The Source of Executive Attention”, ‘Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context’ Essay Competition for Junior Scholars, Edinburgh, June 2008
“Abstract Mechanisms and Causal Powers”, (with Boris Hennig) Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science, Toronto, Canada; May 2017.
“Mechanistic and Mathematical Explanation Unified”, Mechanistic Integration and Unification in Cognitive Science, Warsaw, Poland; June 2016.
“Grounding Inferences from Model Organisms”, First Principles in Science: Their Epistemic Status and Justification, Munich, Germany; June 2016.
“The Absent Body in Psychiatric Classification, Diagnosis, and Treatment”, Canadian Society for History & Philosophy of Science, Calgary, Canada; May 2016.
“Interoception, Eating Disorders, and the Rubber-Hand Illusion”, Body Perception: Clinical, Experimental, and Philosophical Approaches, Tübingen, November 2013.
“Computational Models as Experimental Systems”, Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice, Toronto, June 2013, and Max Planck Institute for History of Science Predoctoral Seminar, Berlin, December 2010.
“Abstract Models, Generic Mechanisms”, Models & Mechanisms, Tilburg, December 2012.
“Computational Models as Mechanistic Explanations”, Models and Simulations 5, Helsinki, June 2012, and Computability in Europe: Turing Centenary Conference, Cambridge, June 2012.
“The Role of Computational Models in Cognitive Neuroscience”, Epistemology of Modeling and Simulation, Pittsburgh, April 2011, and European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Barcelona, July 2009 Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Berlin, June 2009 (poster).
“Aristotle’s Argument against Functionalism”, International Society for History of Philosophy of Science, Budapest, June 2010 (with Boris Hennig).
“Attention, Volition, and the Ghost in the Machine”, European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Geneva, July 2007.
“The Body in Mental Illness”, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Neuroscience and Society Lecture Series, London, Canada; October 2016.
University of Toronto, Cognitive Science Program
Cognitive Science in Practice, Spring 2018
Seminar in Cognitive Science: Moral Psychology, Spring 2017
Seminar in Cognitive Science: Delusions, Spring 2016
Ryerson University, Philosophy
Critical Thinking (2 sections) Winter 2014
Critical Thinking 1 Winter 2014
University of Tübingen, Philosophy, and Max Planck Institute, Neuroscience Graduate School
Epistemology of Experiment (co-taught) Summer 2013
Mental Architectures (block seminar, co-taught) Winter 2012
University of Pittsburgh, History & Philosophy of Science
Causal Reasoning Spring 2009
Principles of Scientific Reasoning Fall 2008
Mind and Medicine (TA for Edouard Machery) Spring 2007
The Nature of the Emotions (TA for Jim Lennox) Fall 2006
University of Toronto, Computer Science (TA)
Web Programming Fall 2001, Fall 2002
Computer Organization Fall 2000, Spring 2002
Discrete Math for Computer Science Fall 1998, Fall 1999, Summer 2000
Introduction to Artificial Intelligence Spring 1999, Spring 2000
Programming Languages Summer 1999
Introduction to Computer Science Fall 1997