William L. Harper
William Harper was born in Potsdam New York on 6 January 1943. In his sophomore year at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, he took a philosophy course that so inspired him that he became a philosophy major and decided on a career as a philosopher. He completed his dissertation, Counterfactuals and Representations of Rational Belief, in 1974 under Henry Kyburg at the University of Rochester.
In 1970 he began teaching as an assistant professor at Western. He was tenured and promoted to associate professor in 1975 and promoted to full professor in 1980. In 2010 he retired with the status Professor Emeritus. In 2011 he became a senior fellow at the Rotman Institute for Philosophy.
He has held positions as a visiting Professor at the University of Pittsburgh, Princeton University, and the California Institute of Technology. From 2002 – 2005 he served as President of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science, having served as First Vice President from 1999 to 2001. He has also served twice on the Governing Board of the Philosophy of Science Association, and was representative of the Association of Symbolic Logic to the American Association for the Advancement of Science from 1982 to 1988.
In 1995 he had the honor of having an asteroid (15849 Billharper) named after him.
As a graduate student, Harper’s fields of study were Logic and Semantics with Rolf Eberle and Henry Kyburg, Foundations of Probability and Philosophy of Science with Henry Kyburg, Epistemology with Keith Lehrer and Henry Kyburg and the Philosophy of Kant with Lewis Beck. His early work included papers developing relations among decision theory and conditionals with applications to game theory and to representations of rational conceptual change. It also included work on Kant and the role of geometry in affording perceptual knowledge of shaped objects located relative to the observer in public three-dimensional space.
His recent book, on Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method: Turning Data into Evidence about Gravity and Cosmology is the outcome of a long research project. In early 1982, Harper was invited to participate in a conference on confirmation at Wayne State University. The other speakers were Clark Glymour and Dan Garber. Harper had witnessed Bas van Fraassen defending his empiricism from Glymour by appealing to a trade off between strength and security that seemed unavoidable if security were measured by probability. van Fraassen claimed that he was simply being more cautious than his realist critics like Glymour. On several of these occasions Harper had remarked from the audience that Newton’s unification of results of Galileo and Kepler appeared to afford a counterexample to the trade off between strength and security that van Fraassen was appealing to. He decided to work out and present appropriate details at the Wayne State conference, giving as his title something like,
Security through strength: Newton’s argument for universal gravity
In preparation he began reading Newton’s argument in detail for the first time. He was so impressed with the power and illumination of Newton’s argument that he embarked upon the investigation that has become this long project. He hopes that his new book offers illumination that does some justice to Newton’s scientific method.
Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method: Turning Data into Evidence about Gravity and Cosmology. Oxford University Press, 2011
Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry Kyburg, Jr., (with Gregory Wheeler),KingsCollege Publications: London, 2007
Causation, Chance and Credence, (with B. Skyrms), Kluwer, 1988.
Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, (with B. Skyrms), Kluwer, 1988.
Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity, (with R. Meerbote), University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Ifs, (with R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce), Reidel, 1980.
Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, (with C. Hooker), Reidel, 1976.
Vol. I: Foundations and Philosophy of Epistemic Applications of Probability theory
Vol. II: Foundations and Philosophy of Statistical Inference.
Vol.III: Foundations and Philosophy of Statistical Theories in the Physical Sciences.
Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics, (with D. Hockney and B. Freed), Reidel, 1975.
On Certainty and Probability, Synthese, v. 90, no. 2, February, 1992.
‘Newton’s Moon-test’ in proceedings of conference honouring Curtis Wilson, edited by George Smith, forthcoming MIT press.
‘Newton, Huygens and Euler: Empirical support for Laws of Motion’ forthcoming in Janiak, A. & Schliesser, E., eds. Interpreting Newton to be published by Cambridge University Press.
‘Huygens, Wren, Wallis, and Newton on rules of Impact and Reflection’ (with Gemma Murray and Curtis Wilson), 153-191 in D. Jalobeanu and P. R. Anstey, eds., Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion, Routledge, 2011.
‘Response to Kent Staley’s Comments on William Harper’s Issaac Newton’s Scientific Method’, 315-319 in The Modern Schoolman, LXXXVII, March and May 2010
‘Newton’s Methodology’ , 43-61 in Myrvold, W. C. and Christian, J., eds., Quantum Reality, Relativistic Causality, and closing the Epistemic Circle: Essays in Honour of Abner Shimony. Springer, 2009.
‘Kant on the Achilles Argument’, 235-355 in Lennon T. and Stainton R., eds. The Achilles of Rationalistic Psychology. New York: Springer, 2008.
‘Acceptance and Scientific Method’, 33-52 in Harper and Wheeler eds. Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry Kyburg, Jr., Kings College Publications: London, 2007
‘Newton’s Methodology and Mercury’s Perihelion Before and After Einstein’, 932-942, in PSA06, Bicchieri C. And Alexander J. eds. Philosophy of Science, vol. 74, No. 5, 2007.
‘Comments on Westphal’, Dialogue 47, 729-736, 2007.
‘Newton Isaac’ entry, 590-594, in Macmillan, Encyclopedia of Philosophy.2nd ed., 2005.
‘Scientific Method’ (joint with Oliver Schulte) entry, 682-688, in Macmillan, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., 2005.
‘Howard Stein on Isaac Newton: Beyond Hypotheses?’, 71-112, in David Malament (ed.), Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science and Mathematics, Open Court, 2002.
‘Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation’, 174-201, in I.B. Cohen and G. Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Newton, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
‘Model Selection, Simplicity, and Scientific Inference’ (with Wayne Myrvold) , S135-S149, Philosophy of Science 69 (proceedings of PSA 2000), 2002.
‘Jupiter’s Moons and the Equivalence Principle’, (Joint with physicists S. R. Valluri UWO and R. Mann Waterloo), 1803-1813, Proceedings of the Ninth Marcel Grossman Meeting on General Relativity, V. G. Gurzadyan, R. T. Jantzen, R. Ruffini, eds. , World Scientific , 2002. (There is also a web page entry from this conference: MG9)
‘Michael Freedman on Kant and Newton’, 279-301, Dialogue, 39, 2000.
‘Solutions Based on Ratifiability and Sure Thing Reasoning’, 67-81, in B. Skyrms, C. Bicchieri, and R. C. Jeffrey, eds., The Logic of Strategy, Oxford University Press, 1999.
‘Newton’s Precession Theorem, Eccentric Orbits and Mercury’s Orbit’ (Joint with physicist S. R. Valluri UWO and mathematician R. Biggs UWO) Proceedings of the Eighth Marcel Grossman Meeting on General Relativity. T. Piran and R. Ruffini, eds., World Scientific , 1999.
‘The First Six Propositions in Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation’, 74-93, The St. John’s Review, vol. XLV, number 2, 1999.
‘The significance of the Matheu-Hill differential equation for Newton’s apsidal precession theory’ (with S. R. Valluri, R. Biggs and C. Wilson) Canadian Journal of Physics, 1999.
‘Measurement and Approximation: Newton’s Inferences from Phenomena versus Glymour’s Bootstrap Confirmation’, 265-287 in The Role of Pragmatics in Contemporary Philosophy (Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg Austria), G. Weingartner, G. Shurz, and G. Dorn, eds., Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1998.
‘Shimony, Abner’ entry for Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy.
‘Isaac Newton’ (with George Smith) Encycopedia of Philosophy, Routledge Press.
‘Abner Shimony’s Philosophical Work’, pp. xi-xiii, in Potentiality, Entanglement, and Passion-at-a-Distance, R. S. Cohen, M. Horne, and J. Stachel, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
‘Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen’ (with Alan Hajek), 91-100, Dialogue XXXVL, 1997.
‘Newton’s Apsidal Precession Theorem and Eccentric Orbits’ (with S. R. Valluri and C. Wilson), 13-27, in Journal for the History of Astronomy, xxvii, 1997.
‘Isaac Newton on Empirical Success and Scientific Method’, 55-86, in The Cosmos of Science, J. Earman and J. Norton, eds., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996.
‘Inferences from Phenomena in Gravitational Physics’ (with R. DiSalle), 46-56, Philosophy of Science, 63 (proceedings PSA 96),1996.
‘Kant, Riemann and Reichenbach on Space and Geometry’, 423-454, in H. Robinson, ed., Proceedings of 1995 International Kant Congress, vol. I, pp. 423-454, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996.
‘General Relativity and Empirical Success’ (with R. DiSalle and S. R. Valluri), 470-71, in Proceedings of the Seventh Marcel Grossmann Meeting on General Relativity, Part A, eds. R.T. Jantzen and G. Mac Keiser, series editor R. Ruffini, World Scientific, 1996.
‘Natural Kind’, entry, 519-20, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, General Editor Robert Audi, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
‘Newton’s New Way of Inquiry’ (with G.E. Smith), 113-166, in J. Leplin (ed.) Scientific Creativity: The Construction of Ideas in Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers,1995.
‘Unification and Support: Harmonic Law Ratios Measure the Mass at the Sun’ (with B. H. Bennett and S. R. Valluri), 131-146, in Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala, Prawitz and Westerstähl eds., Kluwer, 1994.
‘Reasoning from Phenomena in General Relativity’ (with R. DiSalle and S.R. Valluri), 209-214, in Proceedings of the 5th Canadian Conference on General Relativity and Relativistic Astrophysics, World Scientific, 1994.
‘Reasoning from Phenomena: Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation and the Practice of Science’, 144-182, in Action and Reaction: Proceedings of a Symposium to Commemorate the Tercentenary of Newton’s Principia, P. Theerman and A. F. Seef, eds., University of Delaware Press, 1993.
‘Causal and Evidential Expectations in Strategic Settings’, 79-97, in Philosophical Topics, v. 21, no. 1, spring, 1993.
‘Dynamic Deliberation’, 353-364, in PSA 1992, v. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, 1993.
‘Newton’s Classic Deductions from Phenomena’, 183-196, in PSA 90, v. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, 1991.
‘Ratifiability, Game Theory and the Principle of Irrelevant Alternatives’ (with Ellery Eells), 1-19, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v. 69, no. 1, March, 1991.
‘Decisions, Games and Equilibrium Solutions’, 344-362, in PSA 88, v. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, 1989.
‘Consilience and Natural Kind Reasoning (in Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation)’, 115-152, in An Intimate Relation: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, J.R. Brown and J. Mittelstrass, eds., Kluwer, 1989.
‘Causal Decision Theory and Game Theory: A Classic Argument for Equilibrium Solutions, a Defense of Weak Equilibria, and a Limitation for the Normal Form Representation’, 25-48, in Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, W. L. Harper and B. Skyrms, eds., Kluwer, 1988.
‘Kant on the A Priori and Material Necessity’, 239-272, in Kant’s Philosophy of Physical Science, R.E. Butts, ed., Reidel Publishing Co., 1986.
‘Ratifiability and Causal Decision Theory: Comments on Eells and Seidenfeld’, in PSA 1984, v. 2, Philosophy of Science association, 1986.
‘Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory’, 25-36, Erkenntnis, v. 24, 1986.
‘Kant’s Empirical Realism and the Distinction Between Subjective and Objective Succession’, 108-137, in Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity, W. L. Harper and R. Meerbote, eds., University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
‘Kant’s Principle of Causal Explanation’ (with Ralf Meerbote), 3-19, in Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity, Harper and Meerbote, eds., 1984.
‘Kant on Space, Empirical Realism and the Foundations of Geometry’, 143-161, in Topoi, 1984. (Reprinted in Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Carl Posy (ed.), 1992.)
‘Popper Functions’ (with H. Leblanc and B. C. van Fraassen), 140-152, in Essays in Epistemology and Semantics, Leblanc, Stern, Gumb, eds., 1983.
‘A Conditional Belief Semantics for Free Qualification Logic with Identity’, 79-94, in Essays in Epistemology and Semantics, Leblanc, Stern, Gumb, eds., Haven Publications, New York, 1983.
‘Kyburg on Practical Certainty’ (comment on Kyburg’s ‘Rational Belief’, 251-252,in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6:2, 1983.
‘Kyburg on Direct Inference’, 97-127, in Henry Kyburg and Isaac Levi, R. Bogdan, ed., Reidel, 1981.
‘Empirical Realism and Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience’, 465-480, in Synthese, 1981.
‘A Sketch of Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Conditionals’, 3-38, in Ifs, Harper, Stalnaker and Pearce, eds., 1980.
‘Conceptual Change Incommensurability and Special Relativity’, 432-461, in Acta Philosophica Fennica, 20:4, 1979.
‘Bayesian Learning Models with Revision of Evidence’, 357-368, in Philosophia, 7:2, 1978.
‘Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility’ (with Allan Gibbard),125-162 in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach, and E.F. McClennen, eds., Reidel, 1978. (Reprinted,153-190, in Ifs, W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce, eds., Reidel, 1980; The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem, R. Campbell and L. Sowdon, eds., University of British Columbia Press, 1985; Reprinted with revisions, 341-376, in Decision Probability and Utility: Selected Readings, Gardenfors, Sahlin, eds., Cambridge University Press, 1988.)
‘Rational Conceptual Change’, 462-494, in PSA 1976 , v. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, 1977.
‘Toward an Optimization Procedure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics’(with Sherry May), 137-166, in Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, v. I, W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker, eds., Reidel, 1976.
‘Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change’, 117-135, in Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, v. I, W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker, eds., Reidel, 1976.
‘Comments on I.J. Good’, 75-78, in Synthese, v. 30, 1975.
‘Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfacturals’, 222-262, Synthese, v. 30, 1975. (Reprinted, 73-115, in Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, W.L. Harper and C. A. Hooker, eds., Reidel,1976.)
‘A Note on Universal Instantiation in the Stalnaker Thomason Conditional Logic and M Type Model Systems’, 373-379, in Journal of Philosophic Logic, v. 3, 1974.
‘The Jones Case’ (with H. Kyburg), 247-258, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19, 1968.
Michael Woods: Conditionals, Clarendon Press Oxford. In Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 6, No. 2, 358-360,
Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, Harvard 1992, 587-589, in Philosophical Review, 1995.
Isaac Levi, The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability and Chance, M.I.T. Press, 1980; Journal of Philosophy, LXXX, 367-371, 1983.
Wilfred Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXX:1, 1969.
Papers Read (Since 1990)
‘Measurement and Evidence: Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method in Gravity and Cosmology.’ Philosophy of Physics lecture Oxford University, 13 October 2011.
‘Measurement and Evidence: Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method’ Sigma Club presentation at the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, 10 October 2011.
‘Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method’ philosophy department colloquium University of Aberdeen, 29 September 2011.
‘Measurement and Evidence: Newton’s methodology at work in cosmology today’ (with Dylan Gault) at the Philosophy of Cosmology Workshop at UWO, 6 May 2011.
‘Newton’s Scientific Method’ presentation to the Humanist Society in London Ontario, 9 May 2010.
‘Newton’s Scientific Method’ at the Henle Conference on Experimental and Theoretical Knowledge at Saint Louis University, 26 March, 2010
‘Newton’s Scientific Method and Cosmology Today’ Philosophy Department, Bucharest University, Bucharest Romania, 3 July 2008.
‘Newton’s Scientific Method’, 17th Century Colloquium, Bucharest University, Bucharest Romania, 2 July 2008.
‘Huygens, Wren, Wallis, and Newton on Rules of Impact and Reflection’, 17th Century Colloquium, Bucharest University, Bucharest Romania, 1 July 2008.
‘Measurement and Evidence: Newton’s Methodology at work in Cosmology Today’ August 2007, International Congress for Logic Methodology and the Philosophy of Science, Beiging China.
‘Newton’s Methodology and Mercury’s Precession before and after Einstein’, PSA2006, November 2006
‘Newton’s Methodology’ at Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, conference honouring Abner Shimony, July, 2006.
‘Kant on the Achilles Argument’ at UWO workshop on the Achilles project, June 2006
‘Newton’s method and Mercury’s Perihelion before and after Einstein’ at a symposium on Einstein CSHPS 2006, May 2006.
Comment on Bernard Katz & Doris Olin, ‘A Tale of Two Envelopes’ at CPA May 2006.
‘Newton on Method: Evidence and Measurement’ Trent University, philosophy colloquium series, February 2006.
‘Newton on Method and Measurement’ at UWO, philosophy department Colloquium, October 2005.
‘Newton on Unification and Evidence’ presented at conference on Evidence in Physics at UWO, May 2005
‘Kenneth R. Westphal: Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism’ presentation at Author meets critics session at Pacific APA in San Francisco, March 2005.
‘Can a Bayesian Account for Objective Resiliency?’ (with Wayne Myrvold), 12th. International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Oviedo Spain, August 11, 2003.
‘Newton’s Moon-test and the Epistemology of Science’ , interdisciplinary seminar Astronomy, Statistics and Philosophy, University of Michigan, March 5, 2003.
‘Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation and the Practice of Science’ Philosophy Department Seminar, University of Michigan, March 4, 2003.
‘Newton’s Moon-test and Westfall on Fudge-Factors : Exaggerated Precision yes, fudging no.’, Philosophy and History of Science, California Institute of Technology, October 7, 2002.
‘Newton’s Moon-test: Unification and Measurement’, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California at Irvine, October 4, 2002.
‘Lunar Parallax Estimates and Newton’s Moon-test’, presented April 2002 at conference honouring Curtis Wilson, St. John’s College, Annapolis, Maryland.
Participant in Book Symposium : Unifying Scientific Theories, by Margaret Morrison Joint Session of Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science with the Canadian Philosophical Association, May 2001. Participants : William Harper (University of Western Ontario) Alex Rueger (University of Alberta) Andrew Wayne (Concordia University) Margaret Morrison (University of Toronto).
‘Newton’s argument for universal gravitation: Measurement not Deduction’, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, April 2001.
‘Newton’s Argument for Prop. 7 in Pincipia, Book 3’, Interdisciplinary Brown Bag Symposium on History of Science and Technology,York University, April 2001.
‘Newton’s Argument for Prop. 6 in Principia, Book 3’, University of Toronto, Institute for History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, April 2001.
‘Model Selection, Simplicity, and Scientific Inference’ ( with Wayne Myrvold) PSA2000, October , 2000.
‘Jupiter’s Moons as a Test of the Equivalence Principle’ (with S.R. Valluri and R. Mann) The Ninth Marcel Grossman Meeting on General Relativity, Rome Italy, July, 2000.
‘A Defence of Newton’s application of law three to argue that gravity is a force of interaction’, Concordia University, Philosophy and Mathematics colloquium Series, March 24, 2000.
‘Resilient Measurement: A Defense of Newton’s Application of Law Three to argue that Gravity is a Force of Interaction’, University of California at Irvine, Department of Logic and philosophy of Science, February 25, 2000.
‘Newton’s Application of his Third Law of Motion to Gravity’, Philosophy and History of Science California Institute of Technology,February 23, 2000.
‘Kepler and Curve Fitting’ (with Wayne Myrvold) August 21, 1999, 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Cracow, Poland.
‘Howard Stein on Isaac Newton: Beyond Hypotheses?’ May 20, 1999, Steinfest, University of Chicago.
‘Newton’s precession theorem eccentric orbits and Mercury’s perihelion: part I’ (Valluri gave part II which applied the Mathue-Hill differential equation to generate the results I reported in part I), at the Third Eastern Gravity Meeting on General Relativity, which was held at the physics department of Cornell University, March 27, 1999.
‘Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation’ at Newton Conference-March 19-21 1999, St. John’s College-Annapolis Maryland, March 21, 1999.
‘Remarks on Game Theoretic Rationality’ at U.W.O. Mini conference on backward induction in game theory, March 6, 1999.
‘Kant’s Appearances and Hume’s Common Sense Beliefs’ at Lewis White Beck Memorial Conference, University of Rochester, Rochester N.Y., September 27, 1998.
‘Inferences from phenomena in gravitational physics’ (with DiSalle, read by Harper) PSA- 96, October, 1996.
‘Full Belief and Conditional Probability, relation to non-Archimedian Belief, applications to Game Theory’ Carngie Mellon University, Philosophy Dept. Colloquium, September, 1996.
‘Kepler on measuring orbital parameters’ in symposium on Kepler (with B. H. Bennett and R. Martens) at CSHPS, June, 1996.
Commentator on Kenneth Westphal, ‘Buchdahl’s “Phenomenological” View of Kant: A Critique’ APA central division, April 26, 1996.
‘Newton’s Inferences from Phenomena vs. Bootstrap Confirmations’ International Conference on Scientific Quantities organized by Brian Skyrms, Laguna Beach, April, 1996.
‘Inferences from phenomena in gravitation theory’ (with Rob DiSalle, presented jointly) Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine, March, 1996.
‘Michael Friedman on Kant and Newton’ invited paper in symposium in Author Meets Critics session on Michael Friedman’s Kant and the Exact Sciences, Central Division APA meeting, April 27, 1995.
‘Kant and Riemann on Space and Geometry’ invited paper in symposium on Kant’s Theory of Space and time, 8th International Kant Congress, the University of Memphis, March 4, 1995.
‘Newton on Empirical Success’ Department of Physics, Montana State University at Bozeman, January 24, 1995.
‘Newton on Empirical Success and Philosophy of Science’ Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, December 1, 1994.
‘Newton on Empirical Success and Kuhn on Scientific Revolutions’ Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, September 30, 1994.
‘General Relativity and Empirical Success’ (with R. DiSalle and S.R. Valluri), presented by Harper at Seventh Marcel Grossman Meeting on General Relativity, Stanford University, July 24-30, 1994.
‘Newton on Method and Later Physics’ presented at Edelstein Center, Hebrew University at Jerusalem, June 23, 1994.
‘Invited participant in Summer Institute on Game Theory, Rationality and Foundations of Economic Theory’ Hebrew University at Jerusalem, June 13-23, 1994.
‘Isaac Newton on Empirical Success’ Joint CSHPS and CPA symposium paper, Calgary, June 11, 1994.
‘Methodological Themes from Newton’ Philosophy Colloquium, California Institute of Technology, May 1994.
Invited commentator on Bas C. van Fraassen’s ‘Probability and Full Belief’ at Conference in Honour of Hugh Leblanc at University of Quebec at Montreal, March 1994.
‘Theory and Evidence in General Relativity’ (with R. DiSalle and S. R. Valluri, DiSalle presented the paper) was accepted for presentation at the Cornelius Lanczos Centenary Conference sponsored by the Physics and Mathematics Departments of North Carolina State University, December 1993.
‘Kepler’s Derivation of the Elliptical Orbit’ public lecture sponsored by Tufts University, October 15, 1993.
‘Unification and Support: Harmonic Law Ratios Measure the Mass of the Sun’ ( with B.H. Bennett and S. R. Valluri., Bennett presented the talk)at C.P.A., June 1993.
‘Newton’s Ideal of Empirical Success’ presented in Symposium on Newton at C.S.H.P.S., June 1993.
‘Causal and Evidential Expectations in Strategic Settings’ talk invited by Economics Department at California Institute of Technology, May 1993.
‘Isaac Newton and Philosophy of Science’ public lecture sponsored by Philosophy Department at California Institute of Technology, May 1993. Paper also presented at Philosophy Department colloquium, University of California, Irvine, May 1993.
‘Reasoning from Phenomena in General Relativity’ (with R. DiSalle and S. R. Valluri, Presented by DiSalle) at 5th Canadian conference on General Relativity and Relativistic Astrophysics, University of Waterloo, May 1993.
‘Phenomena and Theory: Isaac Newton and the Philosophy of Science’ A Mellon Lecture at the University of Pittsburgh, October 16, 1992.
‘Reasoning and Causation in Decision and Games’ Honours Student Lecture at University Pittsburgh, October 15, 1992.
‘Causal and Evidential Expectations and Strategic Settings’ at the 2nd International Game Theory Conference, Castigliancello, Italy, May 1992. Sponsored by the University of Florence.
‘The Mathematical Foundations of Newton’s Reasoning from Phenomena’ Dubrovnik, April, 1992.
Commentator on Robert Stalnaker ‘What is Non Monotonic Logic’ at Joint UWO-Philosophy and Computer Science Conference, October, 1991.
Summing-Up Discussant at Spindell Conference on System and Teleology in Kant’s Third Critique, Memphis State University.
‘Newton’s Deductions from Phenomena’ Conference on Advances in Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam University, August 19, 1991.
‘Unification and Support’ 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 9, 1991.
Comments on E.F. McClennen’s ‘Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games’ and on P.A. Danielson ‘Is Game Theory Good for Ethics? Artificial High Fidelity’ at Pacific Division APA, March 29, 1991.
‘Unification and Support’ (with B. Skyrms), ‘Whewell on Colligation and Consilience’ and ‘Principia Book III Propositions 1-4’ at Conference on Reasoning from Phenomena at U.W.O., November 2-5, 1990.
Symposiast with Howard Stein and Jon Dorling on Newton’s Classic Deductions from Phenomena, Philosophy of Science Association, October, 1990.
‘Reasoning from Phenomena in Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation’ Philosophy Department Public Lecture, Indiana University, September, 1990.
‘Ratifiability and Rationality in the Theory of Games’ Department of Philosophy Colloquium, University of California, Irvine, September, 1990.
Commentating Chair of session on DeFinetti’s Probabilismo, speakers were Henry Kyburg and Brian Skyrms, Pacific Division A.P.A., Los Angeles, March 30, 1990.
Invited participant in TARK III, the Third biannual I.B.M. Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Asilomar, Calif. March 6-9, 1990.
Philosophical Foundations of Western Thought
Problems in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy
Introduction to Logic
Introduction to Logical Theory
Problems in the Theory of Knowledge (Princeton, Pittsburgh)
Science: Hemple & Kuhn (Pittsburgh)
Hume and Kant
Theory of Rational Choice
Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation:
A Case Study of Turning Data into Evidence (Cal Tech )
Problems in the Theory of Knowledge
Perception (joint with Zenon Pylyshyn)
Kant (Princeton )
Rational Choice and Conceptual Change (Pittsburgh)
Decision and Game Theory
Empirical Success in Gravitational Physic: Newton, Kuhn and Einstein
Gravitation: An interdisciplinary introduction to theory and evidence, Part I, Newton’s Principia (Philosophy, Physics and Astronomy, Applied Mathematics)
Gravitation: An interdisciplinary introduction to theory and evidence, Part II, Einstein’s general relativity (Philosophy, Physics and Astronomy, Applied Mathematics)